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Transition and National Capacity 
After Article 5 Compliance
by Hans Risser [ United Nations Development Programme, Mozambique ] 
and Christian Ruge [ Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource ]
In June 2014, State Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) met in Maputo, Mozambique, for the 3rd Review Conference of the 
APMBC, fifteen years after its entry into force. As the review 
conference approached, State Parties faced a growing call from 
civil society and some State Parties to commit to complete all 
obligations in the treaty as rapidly as possible. The majority 
of State Parties have already completed their APBMC obli-
gations to destroy stockpiles of anti-personnel (AP) mines. 
However, surveying and clearing all known mined areas in a 
state’s territory in accordance with obligations under Article 
5 of the treaty is no easy task. Considerable progress has been 
made, and some states with moderate to heavy contamination 
are moving toward an end state. In 2015, Mozambique com-
pleted demining of all known minefields after approximately 
20 years of survey and mine clearance efforts.1 
As more states approach com-
pletion, governments and mine 
action stakeholders should con-
sider certain issues that arise as 
a consequence. Completion of 
Article 5 obligations is a major 
achievement for mine-affected 
countries but does not mark the 
final conclusion of clearance in 
their country. 
As leader of the Third Review 
Conference, Mozambique facil-
itated a discussion during the 
Review Conference and at a sub-
sequent regional meeting on how 
to prepare for the transition from 
Article 5 clearance to longer- 
term operations that address re-
sidual explosive remnants of 
war (ERW). The objective was to 
identify policy recommendations that may be considered by 
States Parties to the convention. 
The discussion focused on the following questions: * How do national authorities ensure optimal productiv-
ity up until the completion date? * How can national authorities assist deminers in finding 
other employment opportunities following the comple-
tion of all demining tasks?* How should national authorities prepare their mine ac-
tion coordination structures and demining staff for the 
post-completion situation?* How do national authorities retain key operational per-
sonnel throughout closing and quality control opera-
tions and ensure proper documentation of efforts is 
available for future use?
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Figure 1. Belgium: Annual ERW response
All figures courtesy of GICHD’s Management of Residual ERW Project.
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* After Article 5 completion, how will national authori-
ties identify and manage the hazards and risks posed 
by residual ERW?* After Article 5 completion, what will happen to the na-
tional mine action database and will clearance records 
be utilized and updated to manage information on any 
residual ERW accidents and clearance activities?
This article reviews some of the challenges that State 
Parties to the APMBC face in completing their obligations to 
clear all known mined areas, as well as what can be done with 
the national mine action capacity after completion and what is 
needed in the future to respond to the inevitable residual ERW 
contamination. The case of Mozambique provides an example 
of how State Parties and their international partners can pre-
pare for the challenges of completion and plan for the transi-
tion of their national mine action capacity.
ERW Contamination: 
Not Always a Humanitarian Crisis
Most states that have experienced sustained armed conflict 
over the last century will have some sort of explosive ordnance 
problem that needs to be addressed in a rational, transparent 
and systematic manner. Experience from Europe and other 
parts of the world that still contain areas contaminated with 
explosive remnants of war (ERW) dating back to both World 
War I and World War II indicates that this is a problem that 
requires a sustainable, long-term national response. 
Immediately after a conflict, ERW contamination poses a 
serious humanitarian problem and hinders recovery efforts. 
In such cases, proactive survey and clearance operations led 
or assisted by international partners are necessary. Despite the 
best and most thorough clearance operations, a small residual 
risk will remain, and a missed mine, 
piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) 
or previously unknown suspected haz-
ardous areas (SHA) could be identified. 
However minor the risk, residual ERW 
contamination constitutes a certain se-
curity and safety risk to the population, 
and it may hamper and significantly 
increase the cost of infrastructure de-
velopment. Explosive ordnance may 
also be a source of explosive materials 
for groups and individuals involved in 
criminal activities. It is thus a situation 
that needs to be addressed by the state, 
as part of its responsibility to uphold 
the law, provide security and facilitate 
development. A sustainable, national capacity is required to 
identify the risk from any residual ERW and manage the haz-
ards posed to the population.
In order to prepare for this, many current mine-affected 
states need to consider how to transition from having a dedi-
cated mine action center to establishing a sustainable explo-
sive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity. 
Addressing Residual ERW Problems
Addressing long-term ERW contamination requires a dif-
ferent approach and capacity than addressing mined areas. 
Mine clearance under Article 5 is essentially a proactive pro-
cess involving relatively large numbers of survey and demin-
ing teams that are often supported by international technical 
advisors and financial assistance. Addressing the long-term 
ERW problem in most states would entail a reactive process 
involving a smaller, more sustainable national capacity, where 
threats are identified by civilians and cleared by personnel. 
The process requires different timelines as opposed to the five-
to 10-year cycles provided by the APMBC. With little or no 
realistic baseline against which progress may be assessed, it is 
typically impossible to define a definite endpoint. 
Most states need a robust, reactive system for reporting, re-
cording and responding to explosive ordnance that is designed 
to function in a sustainable manner in the long term. However, 
the expertise necessary to set up and maintain a reporting and 
recording system that is trusted by the general public and all 
relevant stakeholders differs from the expertise necessary to 
identify and render safe an unexploded bomb or grenade. 
Governments need to identify what role, if any, current mine 
action coordination structures should have in the transition 
and post-completion scenarios. Preparing for the transition to 
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Figure 2. Japan: Annual ERW Response.
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a post-completion scenario will ensure 
State Parties have a sustainable capac-
ity to report and address the discovery 
of any previously unknown mined areas 
that may eventually be discovered after 
reporting compliance with Article 5. 
Preparing for Completion 
and Transition
National authorities approach-
ing completion of Article 5 obligations 
would benefit from simultaneous-
ly preparing for both completion and 
transition within the same strategic 
framework. In doing so, one could look 
at the Article 5 deadline as an important 
milestone or transition point in a long-
term exercise that aims at maintaining 
a rational and effective response to the 
problem of explosive ordnance. 
Achieving compliance is a major ac-
complishment in itself. However, main-
taining the motivation and technical 
capacity required to ensure the demin-
ing is completed within the timeline set 
by the country’s Article 5 obligations 
is one of the challenges. Previous ex-
perience shows that productivity rates 
among deminers tend to decrease as 
they approach the end of demining op-
erations. Knowing that they are work-
ing toward their own unemployment, 
deminers may be tempted to extend de-
mining tasks for as long as possible for their own economic 
self-preservation. The situation may be further complicated 
when mine-affected communities benefit economically from 
the presence of demining teams (e.g., employment of local 
people or the provision of services to demining teams) creat-
ing an incentive to report clear areas as having mine contami-
nation. Designing incentives and rewards to keep deminers 
and quality assurance inspectors motivated, honest and pro-
ductive until the end is an important issue to ensure demining 
does not fall behind schedule. Restructuring and retraining 
programs that assist deminers’ transition to new employment 
opportunities following the completion of demining tasks 
could also be a means to keep deminers motivated. 
In the case of Mozambique, deminers maintained high mo-
rale and remained motivated through organized completion 
ceremonies for each province, with special recognition given 
to the deminers involved. The government also encouraged 
demining operators to incorporate retraining and education 
programs as well as severance packages for the deminers into 
the operator’s annual budget. Critically, the Mozambique gov-
ernment also discussed the situation with donors and encour-
aged development partners to support deminers’ retraining 
and education.
Mine affected states could benefit from reviewing their 
current resources, such as their technical staff, and determin-
ing how said resources could be used to support long-term 
efforts. Considering how national and international actors 
have invested in building national mine action coordination 
structures, it is worth understanding how these capacities 
can be repurposed for future use by the national authorities. 
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Figure 3. Berlin: Annual disposal of unexploded ordnance in metric tons 1947-2011.
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By creating a viable transition plan for 
mine action structures before all dem-
ining tasks are completed, national au-
thorities can retain skilled employees 
and national capacities. 
When transitioning from large-
scale, internationally-supported de-
mining capacities to smaller, nation-
ally-led, post-completion capacities, 
national mine action authorities should 
review and map their capacities and the 
roles of their mine action centers. To 
use these capacities effectively, nation-
al authorities should compare the abili-
ties of their centers to national legisla-
tion on disaster management and the 
control of the civilian explosives indus-
try (i.e., the production, transportation, 
sale, storage and licensing of commer-
cial operators). Maintaining records of 
clearance operations will be integral 
for future construction projects as well 
as clarifying any liability issues in case 
of future accidents. For many mine- 
affected countries, demining organi-
zations in the field respond to regular 
reports from civilians for EOD spot 
tasks to remove explosive items as part of their normal mine 
action duties. Following Article 5 completion, a sustainable 
national capacity (e.g., police, military or civilian protection 
forces) should be trained to assume this role and the civilian 
population informed on how to report suspicious items.
As an example, a transition plan for post-completion na-
tional capacity may include the need to:1 . Train police, military or civilian protection forces to 
conduct small, EOD spot tasks and accident investiga-
tions as an emergency response for public safety 2. Maintain a national database with information publi-
cally available for liability issues and future construc-
tion projects that may require digging below the depth 
of clearance established by the national mine action 
standard in previously contaminated areas 3. Quality assurance or quality control in EOD or mine 
action related activities to control the implementation 
of national legislation on the production, transport 
and use of explosives in the civilian commercial sector4. Licensing and contracting authority for either com-
mercial entities or nongovernmental organizations to 
conduct future EOD spot tasks as required for residu-
al ERW or clearance operations in a larger area if pre-
viously unknown mined areas are discovered 5. Provide advisory services to private investors and 
planning units or project management units in the 
ministries on how to arrange for any risk reduction 
and verification services (from local/regional firms or 
NGOs) that might be required for future private or 
public development projects
In Mozambique, the aforementioned issues were con-
sidered. With the assistance of the Geneva International 
Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) and the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP), a transitional 
strategy was drafted for the management of ERW. This plan 
called for the transition of the Mozambique Mine Action 
Centre into a training facility, which will be used to equip and 
train police officers in basic EOD in each province. The na-
tional database and all mine clearance records will be handed 
over to the national authority that manages the land where it 
will be maintained and used by anyone seeking to build or de-
velop the area. 
Trainers from the Mozambique National Demining Institute and U.S. AFRICOM conduct 
EOD training in Inhambane Province, Mozambique (September 2015).
Photo courtesy of the Mozambique National Demining Institute
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Starting in 2014, the National Demining Institute part-
nered with the U.S. military’s AFRICOM to train and equip 
a team of Mozambican trainers, who would later train pro-
vincial police officers in ERW identification, risk analysis and 
basic level 1 explosive ordnance disposal. AFRICOM and the 
Mozambique National Demining Institute developed a core 
curriculum and began training police officers, with an aim 
to have a small team of police trained and equipped in each 
province to manage residual ERW after the demining opera-
tors completed the survey and clearance of all known mined 
areas. With the support of AFRICOM and UNDP, trainers 
from the National Demining Institute successfully trained 
and equipped more than 124 police officers across all of the 
country’s 10 provinces by the end of 2015. 
Donors to mine clearance efforts may also benefit from 
considering how to structure their support in a way that fa-
cilitates efficient and effective resource use while retaining 
the national capacities established with their support. In the 
case of Mozambique, the National Demining Institute and in-
ternational demining operators began discussing transition 
plans and retraining of deminers early on. This focus on the 
transition process secured the support of some donors and the 
critical funding for these long-term transitional efforts. 
Structuring international support for this transition peri-
od may address claims by previously mine-affected State 
Parties that financial assistance to address UXO and ERW is-
sues stopped immediately after declaration of Article 5 com-
pliance. While Article 5 compliance may signal the end of 
active demining operations, international support and assis-
tance can and should be used for the establishment of a sus-
tainable national capacity that shifts its focus to other ERW 
priorities such as a response to residual UXO, explosive stor-
age stockpile management or the clearance of other areas con-
taminated by ERW other than landmines. 
See endnotes page 57
Elements of this paper were originally introduced as a dis-
cussion paper to the Third Review Conference of the APMBC 
held in Maputo in 2014. 
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